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Technical Risk in the Mass Media*
Allan Mazur**
The burgeoning scholarly literature on risk barely mentions the
mass media. When anthropologist Mary Douglas visited my university,
shortly after the appearance of her famous book with Aron
Wildavsky,1 which emphasizes the societal basis of risk perception, I
asked if she regarded the news media as important in forming public
judgments of risk, and she responded that she did not, perhaps
reflecting the scholarly consensus of the time. Yet it seems obvious, as
industry and government spokesmen have complained for years, that
news coverage about real or alleged risks raises public concern and
encourages government spending on selected hazards while other
hazards, perhaps more pressing, are ignored.
Social scientists in one corner or another of academia, often out of
touch with each other, are producing excellent research on risk in the
media. My intent in setting out to produce this issue of Risk was to
identify the news media as a primary risk institution, bring the best
work together and publicize it in the risk community, introduce these
workers to one another and encourage more study of the news media's
functioning and effects.
While journalists have made perceptive comments about risk
coverage in the news, I purposively chose social scientists rather than
newspeople, seeking analytical research rather than advice and
* A benefit of working with the eminent and highly professional contributers,
whose work follows in alphabetical order by author, is that they produce a competent
product on time and only a little over the page limit, and they make prompt revisions.
I thank them and Thomas Field for his excellent support.
** Dr. Mazur is Professor of Public Affairs in the Maxwell School, Syracuse
University. He received his B.S. (Physics) from Illinois Institute of Technology, his
M.S. (Engineering) from the University of California, Los Angeles, and his Ph.D.
(Sociology) from Johns Hopkins University..
1 Risk and Culture (1982).
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instruction for reporters. 2 My method was to list, with the help of
colleagues, twelve social scientists whom we regarded as having
produced the most impressive scholarship on news coverage of technical
risk. I was able to reach nearly all of them, and most of those I reached
accepted an invitation to write a ten-page essay describing major
themes in their own work.
Unfortunately the selection is parochial, the contributers mostly
American, but I am pleased that two Germans are included, a result of
my stay last summer in Germany as the guest of Professor Ulrich
Mueller, my host at the research institute ZUMA in Mannheim. No
doubt with more such invitations I will learn to give scholars of other
nations their due.3
For readers with no background in media research, I will introduce
some basics to put these articles in context. In the U.S., nearly all news
stories of national or international scope are first brought to widespread
attention by one or more of a small, central group of large news
organizations including the television networks, the major wire services
and news magazines, and especially The New York Times. Every day
these national organizations produce a pool of news articles from which
thousands of local organs select their news of the day, sometimes
simply repeating stories and sometimes embellishing them from local
sources. Thus, the American public receives a fairly uniform body of
news, whether directly from the national organs, or indirectly through
local ones.
No serious scholar today regards the daily "news" as an objectively
discernible set of events that is collected and disseminated in a wholly
unbiased manner. The shifting character of "newsworthiness," and its
negotiability by reporters and editors and their sources of information,
are well recognized. Modern scholars are also dubious about claims that
public opinion is easily manipulated by news media, as when the
2 For related work by journalists, see Victor Cohen, Reporting on Risk (1990) and
Stephen Klaidman, Health in the Headlines (1991).
3 For examples of British work, see The Mass Media and Environmental Issues
(Anders Hansen, ed. 1993). An American collection akin to this project is Risky
Business (Lee Wilkins & Philip Patterson, eds. 1991).
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"yellow journalism" of the Hearst newspapers was blamed for American
involvement in the Spanish-American War. News media certainly affect
public opinion, but the links are complex and often hard to prove.
The most widely accepted effect of news media on public opinion is
"agenda setting," the placing of certain issues or problems foremost in
the public mind simply by making them salient in news broadcasts or
publications. As put most succinctly by Professors McCombs and
Shaw, the news media cannot tell us what to think, but they do tell us
what to think about.
4
Agenda setting is not a very powerful concept because it is limited
to the most elemental media effect: raising an issue to salience. I believe
one can make a stronger claim about news reporting of technical risks:
Increased coverage not only makes the risk salient, but also turns public
opinion in a negative direction, causing increased opposition to risky
technologies and heightened fear of technical hazards. Unlike
formulations that imply that public negativism is the result of criticism
or negative bias in the news coverage, which certainly may contribute, I
suggest that the amount of coverage rather than its substantive
content is the primary driver of audience negativism. There is by now
considerable documentation that public opposition to risky
technologies rises and falls with the volume of reporting.
5
It should not be surprising that public response to media coverage is
largely independent of the detailed content of that coverage. Hardly
anyone reads a whole newspaper carefully, instead skimming the pages
for articles of special interest. Impressions of a news report may be
formed from scanning its headline, an accompanying picture and its
caption, and perhaps the first paragraph or two of text. We should
therefore distinguish between the substantive content of a story, which
should be intelligible to a careful reader, and simple images that most
4 Maxwell McCombs, Jr. & David Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Function of the
Mass Media, 36 Pub. Op. Q 176 (1972).
5 My own work in this area includes Allan Mazur, Nuclear Power, Chemical
Hazards, and the Quantity of Reporting, 28 Minerva: 294 (1990); Allan Mazur, The
Journalists and Technology, 22 Minerva 45 (1984) and Allan Mazur and Jinling Lee,
Sounding the Global Alarm: Environmental Issues in the US National News, 23 Soc.
Studies Sci.: 681 (1993).
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readers actually absorb from the story. Television news rarely presents
more than simple messages, typically bound up in visual images.
News reports about technical hazards or controversial technologies
such as nuclear power convey a simple image of riskiness, even if they
are written in the balanced format of American journalism, containing
both reassuring and worrisome statements from technical experts who
disagree in their evaluations. In terms of cognitive psychology
popularized by Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, these
simple images, repeated often enough, become an "availability
heuristic" of real or potential danger, raising dire consequences in the
minds of the audience. Therefore, as the quantity of stories increases, so
do public opposition and concern; as the quantity declines, so do
audience worries.
This view implies that we may account for the rise to public concern
of a particular risk by telling how it attained high coverage in the news
media. We know that sources of news - including scientists, politicians
and environmentalists - negotiate with journalists, trading access for
attention, but we lack complete understanding of how the major news
organizations come to give differing quantities of coverage to different
hazards, or to the same hazard at different times. Is coverage simply the
result of deliberate negotiation between sources and journalists, or is it
determined by factors external to these actors and their organizations?
The extent to which the major national news organs are free to set
their own agendas is disputed. To some, it appears that they are highly
constrained by the flow of real world events, as well as ethical and
institutional limits. To others it seems that news organs "construct" our
public issues in a way that is largely independent of real world events
but strongly influenced by the interests of media owners, their
audience, the journalists themselves and their sources of information.
These are some of the issues discussed in the articles that follow.
